The populism in the French Presidential Elections in 2017
—Is National Front declining?

Hirotaka Watanabe

My paper aims to seek the reason why the Extreme Right Populist Party (National Front, FN or National Rally (newly changed name, Rassemblement National, RN) ) in France has been such an influential and powerful party in France and how it became so.

The first is the enhancing French people’s resistance to the establishment of existing political parties. In this sense the recent populist movements are considered as the anti-system revolt. In particular the Socialist government led by Francois Holland had entirely failed to rebuild the financial deficit national economy with increasing the number of the young unemployed as well as the worsening the social security such as more numerous terrorisms in which the second and third generations of immigrants involved.

The second is that Marine Le Pen who is the leader of FN (RN), the daughter of Jean-Mari Le Pen, the founder of this party, had successfully made the hard image of this old fashion extreme right party, moderate, feminine and “de-diabolized” in her word. That means FN has become a more normal party strengthening the realization of the social-welfare state in terms of the democracy and republicanism.

These recent characteristics on the rise of FN (RN) have been largely shared by the extreme right populists in Europe.

Finally the majority of French people didn’t wisely vote for Marine Le Pen as the President. The rational spirit won. Therefore there are still some risks on the FN (RN), such a fragility inside of this party, and a diversity of politics and human relations. This party is now likely to enter into the potential decadence. Is it true?

In conclusion, the populism is originally categorized by the emotional and anti-intellectual movement. The real problem is whether we should regard FN (RN) as the really democratized force or not, just the masked devil.

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A Study of Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction by Three Types of Emitters in the U.S.
–An Analysis from the Aspect of the Social Construction of a Low-Carbon Society and the impact of the Paris Climate Agreement

Michiyo Obi

Soon after U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement in June 2017, the “We Are Still In” declaration, pledging to pursue the Paris Agreement targets, was announced with more than 1,200 signatures of governors, mayors, businesses, investors, and colleges and universities in the U.S. It has grown sufficiently large enough to participate in the COP23 in Bonn with its own pavilion to showcase their climate activities. The “America’s Pledge” initiative was also launched to aggregate and quantify the actions of states, cities and businesses and other non-national actors in the U.S. in meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement, which is keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The “America’s Pledge” published its Phase 1 report in November 2017 saying that the total of 20 states, 110 cities, and over 1,400 businesses with U.S. operations representing $25 trillion in market capitalization and nearly one gigatons of GHG emissions per year have adopted quantified emissions reduction targets. Besides, the nation’s largest consumer of energy, the Department of Defense (DoD) which includes the U.S. military — Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force — has been very active in expanding renewable energy following the 2009 mandate to produce or procure 25% of total DoD facility energy from renewable sources by 2025. What makes those three different types of GHG emitters — sub-state (states and cities), business and the DoD — actively commit to install renewable energy in spite of the Trump administration’s climate policy? How do these different types of emitters cooperate with each other to promote renewable energy, if any? What is the impact of those activities in terms of the recognition and perception of climate change in U.S. society? This article analyses GHG emission reduction by three different types of GHG emitters in the U.S. respectively, focusing on the motivations and reasons from a social constructivist perspective. Then, we would like to examine the social construction of a low-carbon society in the U.S. considering the effect of the Paris Agreement from the aspect of the global governance of climate change.

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Analysis of the surge of the ‘Alternative for Germany’ in the German Bundestag election in 2017
In relation to Refugee Crisis and European integration
Toshiya Nakamura

This paper analyses the surge of the right-wing populist party, ‘Alternative for Germany’ and defeat of Chancellor Merkel’s ruling parties at the 19th Bundestag election in 2017 in conjunction with the 14 Länder parliaments elections in the period between 2014 and 2017.

In the midst of the worldwide populist moves, Germany did not prove to be an exception. The election result will fuel a return to the “the rise of populism” frame. Facing the ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe, the four-year-old right-wing populist party, AfD, which clearly demanded stricter refugee policy, came in the third in the German national election in September 2017. Both ruling parties, CDU/CSU and SPD, which have formed the grand coalition government since 2013, lost significant votes to AfD.

Based on the analysis using statistics published by German Federal Returning Officer, the following results were observed. Namely, the German Bundestag now has six parties instead of four. AfD won votes nationwide, yet the average percentage of the votes for AfD in the new Bundesländer or States in former East Germany, is almost double as much as the one in the old states with 22.5 percent vs 11.1 percent.

I argue that a next government will be less stable in the parliament with six parties, and AfD might have indirect influence on government policies to some extent, although the party will not get into the government. For instance, the fact that CDU and CSU have agreed just after the election, to cap the number of the refugees Germany accepts at 200,000 annually could be regarded as mainstream conservatives yielding to the demands of voters they have lost to AfD. As such, indirect influence of AfD will be expected under a less stable next government.

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Populism as EU Skepticism and Welfare Chauvinism

Toru Harada

Political forces advocating "EU skepticism" tend to be called "Populism". However, in fact, there are variations in EU skepticism. In this paper, I classify Populism as EU Skepticism into 3 types: (1) Southern European Leftist Populism (SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain), (2) Radical Right Populism (French National Front, Dutch Liberal Party, and Danish National Party) (3) Conservative Populism (Poland's Law and Justice and Hungary's Orbán regime)

For (1) and (2), there was originally a difference between the left and right political powers of the political spectrum, whether it is based on the economic dimension or based on the social and cultural dimension. However, after that, Radical Right Populism began to advocate "Welfare Chauvinism" as a new preference on the economic dimension. "Welfare Chauvinism" is one form of nationalism that enthusiastically admires the welfare system of one's own country.

Then, this new position of Radical Right Populism will be in line with the assertions of the Leftist Populism of southern European countries because it overlaps with the stance opposing the reduction of the welfare system of their own by the austerity measures from the EU. That is why the voter who originally leftist wishes for welfare enhancement thought that he could not count on the left party of his country in opposition to the austerity from the EU, and the phenomenon of changing the supporting party to the Radical Right began to be seen. In this extremely realistic situation, opportunities arise that connect the right and left poles together.

Although this "Welfare Chauvinism" certainly attracts the left wing in the sense that it makes institutional sustainability of the welfare system of each EU member state, however, the division between left and right ultimately exists. To be sure, the Radical Right Populism attempts to maintain its own welfare system, but excluding immigrants other than their own nations from the system. In other words, one of the measures of sustainable welfare states is eliminating immigrants as unnecessary burden from the welfare system. To the contrary, the Leftist Populism intends to maintain its own welfare system while embracing immigrants into the welfare system in an equal way with its own people. In other words, leftists try to equalize welfare between their citizens and immigrants.

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Localization of the “Responsibility to Protect” Norm: 
Cambodia’s Appointment of the National R2P Focal Point

Hiromu Miyashita

More than ten years have passed since the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine was endorsed at the United Nations World Summit in 2005. Nevertheless, research to date argues that there is little indication that local actors (insider proponents) have promoted the R2P norm in Southeast Asia, or that they have institutionalized it. However, other evidence suggests that a change has occurred in the region. During a speech in 2015, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen stated that Cambodia can play a leading role in promoting R2P and atrocity prevention in Southeast Asia. Following this, a national R2P Focal Point was appointed in 2016 who engaged in developing a “National Action Plan for R2P” in cooperation with various domestic stakeholders. Cambodia’s appointment of a national R2P Focal Point is the first case of institutionalization of R2P among ASEAN countries.

Why did Cambodia institutionalize R2P? This study aims to answer this question by analyzing the process of R2P institutionalization in Cambodia with a “norm localization” analytic framework. The study concludes that two factors promoted Cambodia’s institutionalization of R2P. The first is the identity of Cambodia, which experienced and addressed the atrocities committed under the Khmer Rouge regime. The second is the adaptation of R2P and persuasion by local actors, such as the High Level Advisory Panel on the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia (HLAP) and the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP).

HLAP has adapted R2P in accordance with the existing values of ASEAN, grafting (demonstration of the relevance of R2P to existing norms and institutions of ASEAN), framing (focusing on the preventive dimension of R2P), and pruning (removal of coercive military aspects of R2P). In addition, the CICP, in partnership with the Asia-Pacific Center for the Responsibility to Protect, is promoting R2P and has persuaded the government of Cambodia to accept R2P through various dialogues.

Consequently, Cambodia has appointed Pou Sothirak, the Executive Director of CICP as a national R2P Focal Point owing to his strong connections to the government formed when he served as a minister, vice-minister, Member of Parliament and Ambassador. While Cambodia accepted and institutionalized R2P in the context of non-interference, this shows an evidence of localization of the R2P norm in Southeast Asia.

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Securitization of a Humanitarian Crisis: Rescue Operations in Mediterranean Sea and the Fight against Smugglers
Satoru Namba

Following the events of the “Arab Spring”, the continuing social and political chaos in the region has contributed to large-scale migration flows. This includes the movement of asylum seekers and refugees from the MENA region and Africa to European countries. In 2015 alone, over a million persons arrived in Europe. In the same year, it has been confirmed that at least 3,771 migrants died while trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. As a response to this “Refugee Crisis”, the European Union decided on a plan to relocate asylum applicants from Italy and Greece to other European countries. However, this plan for burden sharing has been met with opposition from member states faced with the possibility of mass migration. As this example shows, there are sever obstacles to be overcome before a consensus for refugee protection can be reached. At the same time, European policies for restricting migration flows are being developed in “cooperation” between member states and neighboring states of the EU.

In this study, we examine how European efforts towards cooperation in migration control have been advance by the humanitarian crisis. Frontex is a symbolic and practical actor of cooperation for migration control in the European borderlands. Frontex is an EU agency established in 2004, with its headquartered in Warsaw, for the purpose of managing the “external” borders of the EU. However, Frontex’s joint operation works not only to control irregular migration but also to rescue drowning people. This paradoxical function produces the spectacle of the refugee: whereby refugees become victims of smugglers while economic immigrants are a threat to Europe. This analysis will show how the process of securitization and militarization has been accelerated by the humanitarian crisis through the coordinated activities of Frontex on Europe’s borders and in the Mediterranean Sea.

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